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"The monetary construction of Europe resembles the myth of Sisyphus in its origins, but will finish, I 
hope, as well as the Aeneid." 
- Valéry Giscard d'Estaing 
January 25, 1974 
 
  This paper seeks to shed light on the factors driving European monetary integration by examining 
changes in France's diplomacy towards this issue since 1969. Because France has   long been the 
principal advocate of European monetary integration (indeed, the Maastricht Treaty itself is the result 
of a French diplomatic initiative launched in January 1988), the French case is certainly significant. 
However, the French case also presents an interesting paradox: Why has the European country most 
notoriously jealous of its national sovereignty also been the leading proponent for European monetary 
integration? 
  Since 1969, there has been a definite movement in French monetary diplomacy away from 
national sovereignty and towards greater integration. While Charles de Gaulle saw no need for 
coordinated policies, new European institutions or compromising French national sovereignty in any 
way, his successor, Georges Pompidou, proposed closer European cooperation through a narrowing of 
intra-EC parity margins and the creation of a Community Reserve Fund. When Valéry Giscard 
d'Estaing took office in 1974 he proposed creating a common currency for the EC, which was later 
incarnated within the European Monetary System (EMS) as the European Currency Unit (ECU). 
Building on Giscard's ideas, Edouard Balladur proposed constructing a European central bank in 
January 1988. The French draft treaty on economic and monetary union, submitted by Pierre 
B‚r‚govoy in January 1991, went beyond Giscard and Balladur's ideas, suggesting that national central 
banks be required to implement the decisions of a politically independent European Central Bank and 
that the Ecu be transformed into a single currency that would replace all national currencies within the 
Community. In accepting the final version of the Maastricht Treaty, France went further still in its 
willingness to surrender sovereignty by agreeing that all national central banks should be made politically independent and by accepting strict convergence criteria for economic policy covering price 
stability, interest rates, deficits, debt and currency stability. 
  My research attempts to demonstrate that change in the structure of the international monetary 
system has been the driving force for these changes in France's European monetary diplomacy. Since 
1969, France has tried to construct European monetary institutions that would protect its high growth 
economic policies from the ill effects of external monetary disruption. It has continually sought ways 
to achieve this objective at least cost to French national sovereignty. However, because France has 
often proved unwilling to compromise on the issue of sovereignty the resulting monetary institutions 
created by the EC were not strong enough to shield the franc from external turmoil. As a result of these 
failures, France gradually became more willing to trade sovereignty for influence -- to transfer more 
power to the European level in order to create truly effective European monetary institutions. 
 
 
Explaining European Monetary Integration 
 
 
  By signing and later ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, the states of the European Community (now 
European Union), committed themselves to creating a European central bank and a single European 
currency by 1999.  By its very nature, monetary integration involves a partial form of political 
integration. Monetary integration requires collective action by governments on exchange rates and all 
those policy areas that affect them: interest rates, price levels, incomes, taxes, public spending and 
public borrowing -- virtually the whole gamut of economic policy. Since these are major bones of 
contention within any nation's domestic politics, the process of European monetary integration is 
inevitably a political process, as well. Furthermore, monetary integration itself also has unavoidable 
political consequences that will inevitably influence the shape of Europe's future. Because Europe has 
decided to move farthest in this area, monetary integration is likely to provide the cornerstone for the 
Continent's future political architecture.[1] 
  Putting aside for the moment the difficult question of whether or not the Maastricht treaty can be 
implemented, why was it signed and ratified in the first place? Despite the importance of the issue, 
European monetary integration presents a theoretical puzzle for economists and political scientists 
alike. Explanations for European monetary integration put forward in recent years include: 
 
1. 1992 spill-over. The integration of European financial markets called for in the 1992 single market 
project made economic and monetary union (EMU inevitable. 
2. EMS politics. EMU is a move by some states to reduce the 
German Bundesbank's dominance in European monetary affairs. 
3. German unification. EMU reflects a desire to bind a reunified Germany more closely to Western 
Europe during a period of  - geo-political uncertainty. 
4. credibility. EMU is a move to increase the credibility of anti-inflationary policy commitments made 
by member states. 
5. scapegoating. EMU provides an international commitment that political leaders can blame for 
making unpopular domestic economic reforms. 
6. domestic politics. Domestic interest groups favoring exchange rate stability prevail on their 
governments to pursue EMU. 
7. linkage politics. EMU is part of a larger network of inter-state bargains among members of the 
European Community. 
8. institutions. The direction of monetary integration is determined by institutional constraints at both 
the European and national levels. 
9. regime norms. Over time states have internalized the norms of cooperation embodied in Europe's 
monetary regime. 
10. global economy.Pressures generated from the international economy provide the impetus for 
European monetary integration.[2] 
  The theoretical confusion over the causes of European monetary integration is apparent from the 
list above. One recent influential article on the subject suggests that there is "little prospect of a neat, 
unitary theory of national preferences" to explain European monetary integration.[3] Another recent 
theoretical study co-authored by two prominent scholars of European monetary integration (one an economist, the other a political scientist) concludes "that (European monetary unification) is driven 
mainly by political rather than economic factors, although our understanding of even these political 
forces remains incomplete."[4] Complicating these theoretical problems is the fact that there is a 
relative scarcity of empirical work on the political motivations for European monetary integration.[5] 
  This paper attempts to help fill that gap by examining changes in France's diplomacy towards 
European monetary integration since 1965. Rather than attempt to provide a complete explanation for 
French policy preferences, this paper focuses on how and why these preferences changed over time, in 
an attempt to discover clues as to their underlying causes. A firmer understanding of how state 
preferences change is significant not only for its own sake, but for the sake of building a predictive 
theory of integration. 
 
 
The Context for French Monetary Diplomacy 
 
 
  This paper argues that change in the structure of the international monetary system has been the 
driving force for change in France's European monetary diplomacy. The floating exchange rates, huge 
international financial markets and high mobility of capital which characterize the contemporary 
international financial system have progressively stripped from European states the ability to pursue 
independent national monetary policies.[6] States find themselves in a global competition for capital 
that reduces their ability to set monetary policy according to domestic policy goals.[7] The breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in 1973 fed a process of geometric expansion in 
international financial markets, facilitated by advances in information and telecommunications 
technology. Global turnover on foreign exchange markets was estimated at $1 trillion a day in 1992, a 
300% increase from just 1986. The New York market alone went from a daily turnover of $10 billion 
in 1977 to $192 billion in 1992. As a result, central bank reserves have declined as a percentage of the 
global daily turnover on foreign exchange markets, reducing their ability to stabilize exchange rates 
through market intervention. A recent IMF report suggests that this expansion of global financial 
integration is still in its "adolescence".[8] 
  The abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates presented a particularly 
inhospitable environment for French economic policy. Since 1945, French leaders have been 
committed to a strategy of high economic growth, explicitly designed to advance 
French power internationally and bolster political stability at home.[9] Monetary laxity was the means 
for implementing this policy, funding rapid growth through "the generous allocation of credit under 
state tutelage and guarantee."[10] Demand for credit was matched by supply, at first directly from the 
state and later through the banking system which itself was highly regulated by the French Treasury 
and dependent on central bank financing.' Although this strategy was highly inflationary, the Bretton 
Woods system insulated the franc's exchange rate from speculative pressures for long periods of time. 
When these pressures could no longer be resisted, the Bretton Woods system allowed the French to 
devalue their currency. The new exchange rate would be insulated against external disruption in the 
same way as the old, allowing the French cycle of inflationary high growth policies to resume once 
again. 
  The collapse of Bretton Woods knocked this external prop out from under the franc. As foreign 
exchange markets expanded in response to the uncertainty of floating exchange rates, France found 
itself forced to rely more heavily on domestic mechanisms to stabilize the franc. However, France's 
policy of expansion based on easy credit had created an "overdraft economy" that was so dependent on 
guaranteed credit that it could not be stabilized using internal adjustment mechanisms without risking 
brutal deflation.[11] Compounding this vulnerability was the fact that under floating exchange rates, 
the international monetary system tended to revolve around a dollar-deutschemark axis. During periods 
of dollar weakness, funds tend to go out of dollars and into deutschemarks.[12] This puts upward 
pressure on the mark in relation to other European currencies, especially the franc, regardless of 
whether domestic economic policies within the EC are divergent or not. As a result, floating exchange 
rates confronted France with a vicious cycle of currency depreciation and price inflation that 
progressively retarded its ability to pursue economic growth.[13] 
 
 The Gaullist Legacy 
 
 
  In examining the evolution of France's European monetary diplomacy it is first necessary to 
review the legacy of President Charles de Gaulle. In February 1965, de Gaulle proposed replacing the 
dollar-based Bretton Woods system with a strict gold standard. De Gaulle made clear at the time the 
extent to which France's monetary diplomacy was a response to the adverse effects of the dollar-based 
Bretton Woods system. 
  
  ....the fact that many countries accept dollars on the same basis as gold to eliminate deficits, which 
appear as credits in the American balance of payments, gives the Americans the possibility to contract 
interest-free debts  abroad, for what they owe they pay -- at least in part -- with dollars which they can 
create at will and not with gold, which has real value, whose possession one has to work for, and which 
cannot be transferred to others without risk or sacrifice. But this one-sided opportunity which America 
has also contributes to undermining the idea that the dollar is all impartial and international means of 
payment, though it is actually merely a means of credit of one state.[14] 
  De Gaulle believed that a strict gold standard would strip the US of its ability to escape balance of 
payments constraints, resulting in a more stable international environment for French economic 
policies.[15] Although his rhetoric may have been sharp, in practice de Gaulle's challenge to the 
Bretton Woods system was rather mild. France sought to reform the existing fixed exchange rate 
system, not destroy it. Although after 1965 France regularly exchanged its dollar holdings for gold, it 
did not exploit or encourage speculation against the dollar.[16] In the French view, the dollar-based 
system was crumbling under its own weight. Total collapse of the system would destroy fixed 
exchange rates - a situation the French did not favor. Instead, they favored an orderly transition by 
international agreement to a new system of symmetrical obligations based on gold. As De Gaulle told 
his cabinet during the dollar crisis of March 1968: 
 
  Now the crisis of the dollar that is currently developing illustrates that the present system, based 
on privileged reserve currencies, is not only inequitable but from now on inapplicable. To seek to 
impose it any longer would be to condemn the world to serious economic and social trials. 
A monetary system based on gold which alone is immutable, impartial and universal must therefore be 
implemented. This reform would naturally include an organization of international credit consistent 
with the far-reaching, mobile and rapid nature of trade in our times.[17] 
  Ultimately, de Gaulle's challenge to the Bretton Woods system was based on a fundamental 
miscalculation. Assuming that continuing weakness of the dollar could only lead to the end of its 
dominance over the international monetary system, he had seen a strict gold standard as the only 
logical alternative. However the expected abandonment of the dollar for gold never took place. De 
Gaulle's unwillingness to sacrifice French national sovereignty, meant that Europe could not 
collectively mount a challenge to American leadership over the international monetary system. 
Although de Gaulle sought diplomatic support from his European partners, he made no effort to 
increase the Community's role in international monetary affairs. Such an approach would require 
narrower cooperation and more constraints on French autonomy than de Gaulle was willing to 
contemplate. De Gaulle favored a strong role for Europe in world affairs, but he envisioned a 
confederal Europe, a Europe des parries, under French tutelage. De Gaulle saw no need for coordinated 
European policies, new European institutions or compromising French sovereignty in economic affairs 
in any way. Not surprisingly, therefore, when push came to shove, France's European partners, 
especially West Germany, were unwilling to risk the adverse consequences of challenging the dollar's 
hegemony.[18] 
  The failure of de Gaulle's diplomacy left the franc horribly exposed during the events of May 1968. 
Student and workers' riots starting that month brought the economy to a standstill and nearly toppled 
the entire political structure. In less than two months, 750 million working hours were lost due to 
strikes and lockouts. The resulting losses in productivity, totaling some 3% of GDP, led to enormous 
reserve losses, while economic and political turbulence triggered speculation against the franc and 
massive capital flight. Pressure against the franc did not subside until de Gaulle's successor, Georges 
Pompidou ordered an 11.1% devaluation on August 8, 1969.[19] 
  
Pompidou and the Werner Plan 
 
 
  The failure of De Gaulle's policy, convinced Georges Pompidou that France would have to 
cooperate more closely with its EC partners. Shortly after coming to power, he called for a summit 
meeting of EC leaders to launch a new initiative in monetary affairs. This summit meeting, which took 
place in the Hague in December 1969, called for the creation of an economic and monetary union 
(EMU) within the Community by 1980. In March 1970, a special commission known as the Werner 
Group was appointed to study EMU proposals. 
  The French proposals submitted to the Werner Group were designed to shield the franc by 
reducing the EC's exchange rate dependence on the dollar and by fostering a coordinated European 
monetary response to US actions in the international monetary system. They emphasized two elements: 
a narrowing of intra-EC parity margins and the creation of a Community Reserve Fund.[20] The 
French plan suggested an immediate reduction of the parity margins between EC national currencies 
from 1.5% to 1.0% as a first step towards irrevocably fixing EC exchange rates. By narrowing intraEC 
exchange margins, France sought to encourage greater use of Community currencies in intra-European 
payments in order to reduce the threat dollar instability posed to Europe.[21] The proposed Reserve 
Fund would manage a portion of the member states' reserves and the community's allotment of SDRs. 
Organized along strictly confederal lines, its main functions would be to administer short- term 
monetary credits, facilitate the narrowing of EC exchange rate margins, increase the international use 
of Community currencies and eventually intervene directly in the market for dollars. Through the 
narrowing of exchange margins and the reserve fund, France hoped eventually to dislodge the dollar 
from its central role in intra-European payments, thus reducing European (and hence, French) 
vulnerability to the vicissitudes of dollar instability. 
  French proposals were external in orientation, focusing on the problems of the weak dollar, 
irresponsible American monetary policies and the threat posed by international speculators. Pompidou 
did not seek a war on the dollar, but rather saw cooperation as a way of reducing Europe's dependence 
on the dollar and of pressuring the US to take measures to correct its deficits. Pompidou made this 
connection quite clear: 
 
  What is necessary ... is that the European nations, beginning with France, try together to create, 
not a single currency -- we are far from that -- but an ensemble mon‚taire, a certain monetary union 
which would, by its economic weight, permit the European countries to balance the dollar in some 
fashion.[22] 
  Europe can help find a solution (to international monetary turmoil if it creates itself a monetary 
entity, which would permit it to establish a pole of equilibrium with respect to the dollar, that is, to 
make European currencies not purely and simply dependencies of the dollar.[23] 
 
  Despite Pompidou's desire to create a European monetary pole to balance the United States, he set 
firm limits to the' amount of national sovereignty that would be sacrificed to achieve it. France resisted 
West German proposals for rigid policy coordination before the introduction of fixed exchange rates 
and the creation of supranational monetary institutions.[24] 
As a result, the final version of the Werner Plan, approved in March 1971, reflected a rather watered-
down compromise. Margins of fluctuation between EC currencies would be reduced, but further 
progress on fixing exchange rates would be linked to progress in tile area of policy coordination, a 
formula known as "parallelism". Plans to create supranational institutions were dropped, while creation 
of a reserve fund would depend on the successful functioning of the exchange rate mechanism.[25] 
  The international monetary turmoil in the wake of the Nixon Administration's decision to suspend 
the dollar's convertibility into gold in August 1971 made it impossible to implement the Werner Plan's 
narrowing of EC exchange rates until March 1972.[26] Since the EC bands of fluctuation moved 
within the dollar bands, this arrangement was dubbed "the snake in the tunnel." In April 1973, the 
reserve fund the French had sought was created, labeled the European Monetary and Cooperation Fund, 
or FECOM according to its French acronym. However, because the French had been unwilling to 
make FECOM into a supranational institution, the Germans stubbornly rejected French backed 
proposals to pool 20% of the member states' reserves under FECOM's control.[27]   FECOM and the Snake were too weak to protect the franc from international monetary turmoil. 
They could not prevent the complete disintegration of the Bretton Woods system in March 1973, 
which utterly changed the costs and benefits of French participation in the Snake. As originally 
conceived, the Snake was supposed to operate within the confines of the Tunnel, i.e. fixed exchange 
rates at the international level. This implied a German obligation to maintain the deutschemark's parity 
against the dollar. Without the constraint of the Tunnel, the snake imposed an obligation on France to 
follow the mark without setting any corresponding limits on German action. 
  When the international monetary system was further rocked by the first energy crisis in the fall of 
1973, France was not willing to pay the cost of staying in the Snake in terms of lost reserves or lost 
economic growth. To protect French reserves and put French industry on a competitive footing in the 
wake of higher energy prices, France decided to withdraw from the Snake on January 19, 1974.[28] 
 
 
Giscard and the Ecu 
 
 
  The failure of the Snake to protect the French economy from the economic and monetary turmoil 
of the early 1970s led Pompidou's successor, Val‚ry Giscard d'Estaing, to push French monetary 
diplomacy further in the direction of Europe. French'proposals centered around an idea that had long 
been one of Giscard's pet projects -- the creation of a common currency for the European 
Community.[29] The Community currency Giscard had in mind would not replace national currencies. 
Rather national currencies would remain in use within each national economy, while the Community 
currency would replace the dollar as a means of settlement between European countries. The 
Community currency would actually be a basket made up of the national currencies and would be 
backed by a portion of the official reserves of the member states pooled into a European Monetary 
Fund. Each national currency would have a central rate against the Community currency that could be 
changed if necessary.[30] 
Giscard's designs were formed to counter external constraints. As his close political ally, Michel 
Poniatowski noted: 
  
  "(Europe) will make itself, slowly, progressively .... (I)t will be a response, a defense, a resistance 
to external pressures. The institutions will vary according to the intensity of these pressures. The 
weaker the constraint, the weaker the unification, but the stronger the constraint, the greater unification 
will be."[31] 
 
  Giscard himself identified monetary integration as the primary objective of France's European 
diplomacy.[32] The primary purpose of the Community currency would be to raise the specter of an 
alternative to the dollar as an international currency and thus perhaps nudge the US into taking the 
policy measures necessary to protect its currency.[33] If this succeeded, a measure of international, and 
thus European, monetary stability would be restored at little cost to Europe. If this failed, a Community 
currency could still provide a defense for the franc against dollar instability. By reducing the dollar's 
role in intra-EC payments it would reduce the vulnerability of EC currencies to fluctuations in the 
dollar. 
  If international markets developed for the Community currency it could provide an alternative to 
the deutschemark as a haven for funds fleeing the dollar and thus reduce the vulnerability of EC 
exchange rates to dollar instability. Integral to Giscard's design was the idea that the exchange rate of 
the Community currency would be managed against the dollar. Individual states would set their rates 
against the Community currency, whose rate in turn would be decided in relation to the dollar.  In 
practice, primary responsibility for maintaining the Community currency's rate against the dollar 
would fall on West Germany, since funds flowing from dollars to marks during a dollar crisis would 
lift the mark against the Community currency before it would affect other national currencies in 
Western Europe. In effect, a Community currency along these lines would re-introduce a German 
obligation to defend the mark-dollar exchange rate. It was also believed the need to defend the 
Community currency's exchange rate would also force progress on the issue of strengthening a 
Community reserve fund.[34]   Although creating a Community currency would require closer European cooperation than had 
been undertaken by Pompidou, Giscard saw that acting collectively, Europe could achieve more with 
fewer resources. Less concerned with maintaining absolute freedom of maneuver, Giscard sought to 
reduce the extent of French dependence in international monetary affairs. A Community currency 
would provide France more influence internationally and more autonomy in domestic policy while 
shifting the brunt of the burden of European monetary stability on to West Germany. Nevertheless, 
Giscard remained concerned over the question of national sovereignty, continuing his predecessor's 
opposition to both formal processes for economic policy coordination and the creation of any 
supranational European institutions to manage the proposed European currency.[35] 
  Giscard found turning his dream of a European currency into a reality rather difficult. In March 
1975, a new unit of account for the Community was defined against a basket of EC currencies, but its 
use was far more restricted than the French had originally hoped.[36] Giscard's decision to bring the 
franc back into the Snake in July 1975 was followed by a second humiliating withdrawal in March 
1976, severely weakening his diplomatic efforts to create a Community currency.[37] It wasn't until 
1978 that an opening for French diplomacy presented itself. A new dollar crisis and international 
pressures on West Germany to reflate its economy, motivated its chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, to join 
with Giscard in launching the European Monetary System (EMS), which came into operation in March 
1979.[38] 
  The new EMS saw the transformation of the European unit of account into the European Currency 
Unit, or ECU. Each national currency was given a divergence threshold relative to its central rate 
against the ECU to single out which countries might be the source of instability within the system.[39] 
Crossing the divergence threshold would entail a "presumption" to act, unless after consultation with 
the other central banks, it was agreed that action was unnecessary.[40] 
  However, French unwillingness yet again to compromise on the issues of policy coordination and 
supranationality prevented the ECU from becoming the centerpiece of the EMS. The German 
Bundesbank thwarted French proposals for a European Monetary Fund that would manage the ECU's 
rate against the dollar and insisted that the ECU be treated merely as a swap arrangement by central 
banks, renewable every three months by unanimous consent of the member states.[41] The system of 
central rates against the ECU did not replace the parity grid system of the Snake, but rather existed 
alongside it. Furthermore, in practice, the divergence'indicator failed to operate as a symmetrical 
system of adjustment between EMS currencies.[42] 
 
 
The Socialist Experiment and its Aftermath 
 
 
  The institutions of the EMS were not strong enough to shield the franc from international turmoil 
or domestic folly. For one thing, the EMS proved an inadequate check against the mix of fiscal and 
monetary policies pursued under the Reagan Administration, which produced high US interest rates 
and a strong dollar. At the same time, the new French government that came to power after the election 
of Francois Mitterrand in 1981 embarked on a neo-Keynesian reflation of the French economy. The 
EMS offered France some protection from these forces, but not enough to allow France to continue 
following a unilateral course in economic policy. In the rather hostile international context created by 
US policies, the Socialist experiment in France failed abysmally, producing inflation and excessive 
indebtedness without any significant economic growth.[43] 
  Mitterrand briefly considered pulling France out of the European Monetary System in March 1983. 
However, the constraints of the international financial system made this alternative little less than 
suicidal.[44] In a report on the consequences of French withdrawal from the EMS, French Treasury 
Director Michel Camdessus outlined the nature of these constraints: 
 
  As of March 31, 1983, the foreign exchange reserves, at the rate of one dollar to 7.5 francs, are on 
the order of 30 billion francs. With this we can hold for several days, but not weeks. Withdrawing from 
the Snake would create a gap of at least 20% between the franc and other major currencies. Now to 
devalue when we have 330 billion (francs) of debt is ipso facto to increase this debt by considerable 
proportions: 400 billion francs. Additionally, a gap of greater than 15% would have as its immediate 
consequence the absence of all control over the exchange rate. And if we leave the EMS, we lose all European support in Ecu. Our ability to borrow would be greatly reduced .... (I)t would be necessary to 
increase interest rates to defend the franc. These rates, already at 14%, could jump to 20%, maybe 
more. With consequences one can well imagine.[45] 
 
  March 1983 turned out to be a watershed for French European monetary diplomacy. While 
previously France's European monetary diplomacy had been subordinated to the demands of its' 
domestic economic strategy, after 1983 France's domestic economic policy was subordinated to the 
requirements of its European monetary diplomacy. The failure of the Socialist experiment revealed and 
exacerbated the extent of France's vulnerability to the international financial system. As Serge July 
noted: "(After March 1983) it was necessary to renounce all our pretensions of molding the world in 
our own image and to admit that it was no longer possible to avoid the 'global crisis' ... "[46] 
  Unable any longer to fend off international constraints, the French Socialists made a virtue out of 
necessity by embarking on a bold new strategy: a complete reversal of Socialist dirigiste policies in 
favor of a program of economic liberalism designed to bolster the competitiveness of French industry. 
This strategy included anti-inflationary economic policies, a complete overhaul of the French financial 
system and a diplomatic initiative to construct a single European market that eventually culminated in 
the Single European Act.[47] 
  Despite the radical departure this strategy represented, there were also important continuities. 
Economic growth remained the most important objective of French policy. However, it was recognized 
that the high mobility of capital internationally coupled with floating exchange rates meant this goal 
would have to be achieved through international competitiveness rather than domestic reflation. Low 
inflation was desirable not for its own sake but only as a means to this end.[48] Therefore, European 
monetary integration remained desirable as a way of mitigating the harsh effects of the international 
environment. Likewise, French ambitions to build the single market, particularly in the area of finance, 
were both a reaction to international constraints and a way to force progress towards European 
monetary integration. As Mitterrand declared after the EC Hannover summit in June 1988: 
 
  It is not possible to envisage the liberation of capital movements without reinforcement of the 
European Monetary System. These things are linked together. The facts will speak for themselves.[49] 
 
 
Balladur's European Central Bank Initiative 
 
 
  International monetary developments in the late 1980s put further pressure on French diplomacy. 
By 1985, the Reagan Administration's fiscal and monetary policies had created a severely overvalued 
dollar and enormous American trade deficits, threatening to make US products uncompetitive, 
jeopardizing American jobs and creating domestic pressures for protectionism. The Plaza Accord of 
September 1985 initiated a process of international macro-economic policy coordination among the 
Group of Five -- the United States, Japan, West Germany, France and the United Kingdom -- designed 
to reduce the value of the dollar.[50] However, dissatisfied with the pace of the dollar's decline, US 
Treasury Secretary James Baker engaged in a strategy of deliberately "talking down" the dollar, 
beginning in the summer of 1986. 
  International monetary turmoil surrounding the dollar provoked another EMS crisis during 
January 1987, in which the deutschemark was forced into a 3% revaluation.[51] This crisis did produce 
two rather favorable consequence for France. First, the Louvre Accords of February 1987 established a 
confidential system of target zones between the G5 currencies. This went some way towards the 
French objective of re-establishing the primacy of exchange rate stability in the international monetary 
stability -- at least in principle.[52] Second, the Basle-Nyborg accord of September-October 1987 
strengthened the EMS by allowing greater intra-marginal or "orangelight" intervention that would help 
EMS countries counter speculation against their currencies by allowing them to use EMS credit 
facilities before their currencies actually reached their intervention limits.[53] 
  However, these innovations failed to prevent or address the crisis created by the crash of October 
19, 1987, when the New York Stock Exchange suffered a 500 point loss -- a decline of 20%, the 
largest drop in history, in both relative and absolute terms. The European Monetary System was spared 
another realignment only by coordinated French-German action on short-term interest rates. The Bank of France raised rates while the Bundesbank lowered them, creating a 5% spread that effectively killed 
speculation against the franc.[54] 
  It was in response to this international turmoil, that French finance minister Edouard Balladur 
proposed the creation of a European central bank in January 1988.[55] Comments made by Balladur at 
the time clearly show the role that international factors played in this decision. 
 
  Europe cannot accept living under the threat of international monetary and financial disorders. It is 
necessary to reinforce its economic, monetary and financial organization. Europe must have a common 
attitude towards the dollar and the yen. It must come to speak with one voice on the international 
monetary scene.[56] 
 
  Balladur's central bank initiative represented a step beyond previous French proposals to create a 
reserve fund and a significant movement towards closer integration. However, in some significant 
ways Balladur's proposals reflected a continuing French desire to minimize surrendering national 
sovereignty. If the French desired a European central bank, they had a very particular view about what 
kind of bank they wanted. A "central bank of central banks" was the desired goal which would 
complement, but not replace national central banks. The European central bank itself would be outside 
the institutional framework of the European Community and clearly subordinated to the political 
control of the national governments. It would manage a portion of the member states' official reserves 
and act on international markets to protect EC exchange rates against external disturbances. For their 
part, national banks would act to maintain intra-EC parities according to precise obligations for 
intervention and adjustment affecting strong as well as weak currency countries. It was also clear from 
this arrangement that the ECU would be a point of reference, a reserve instrument and a means of 
intra-European payments, but would not replace national currencies within their own states.[57] 
  Balladur's central bank initiative started the process that eventually culminated in the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. The Hannover EC summit of June 1988 approved the 
appointment of an expert committee to report on monetary integration. This committee produced the 
Delors report in April 1989, which delineated a three stage process for creating a European central 
bank and a single European currency. The Madrid summit of June 1989 endorsed the Delors report and 
called for an intergovernmental conference to draft a new treaty for European monetary integration. 
The Strasbourg summit of December 1989 decided to convene this intergovernmental conference in 
1990. The Rome summit in October 1990 approved an agenda for economic and monetary union 
which would include a European central bank and fixed exchange rates. The intergovernmental 
conference itself, which would produce the Maastricht Treaty, opened in Rome in December 1990. 
 
 
Negotiating Maastricht 
 
 
  The French draft proposals for a treaty on economic and - monetary union, presented to the 
intergovernmental conference in January 1991 by Balladur's successor Pierre B‚r‚govoy, marked a 
significant advance over any previous French proposal in its willingness to surrender a portion of 
French national sovereignty. Whereas previous French proposals had called for the creation of a 
common European currency that would coexist with national currencies, Bérégovoy's draft called for 
the transformation of the Ecu into a single currency that would replace all national currencies within 
the Community -- including, needless to say, the franc. Furthermore, it called for a European system of 
central banks, in which national central banks would be required to implement the decisions of a 
politically independent European Central Bank. Although the European central bank would have an 
obligation to support the general economic policy of the EC, established by national leaders at EC 
summit meetings, it was also stipulated that this should not contradict with the objective of maintaining 
price stability.[58] 
  A number of important developments since Balladur's central bank initiative help explain the more 
far-reaching concessions on sovereignty in Bérégovoy's draft treaty. First, although the international 
monetary system remained relatively calm during this period, the G-5 process of international 
monetary coordination was virtually abandoned by the United States, virtually guaranteeing disorderly 
international monetary conditions in the future.[59] Second, in line with EC efforts to create a single European financial market, France had abolished all its exchange controls in January 1990.  As a result, 
the franc was more exposed to international pressures than it had ever been before; therefore, the need 
to provide further protection for EC exchange rates also increased. 
  However, far and away the most important influence on French European monetary diplomacy 
during this time was the reunification of Germany. The Cold War division of Germany and the 
subordination of its western half within NATO had provided France the opportunity to pursue an 
independent foreign policy. The end of this division threatened to loosen unified Germany from its 
Cold War moorings. In this new environment, France's leaders feared that its own independence could 
only encourage German independence, which in turn would inevitably mean French marginalization. 
The uncomfortable trade-off between sovereignty and influence had intensified. Under these 
circumstances, French leaders decided that the process of European integration, and in particular the 
process of monetary integration, needed to be accelerated to preserve its influence before its position 
eroded.[60] 
  In the final version of the Maastricht Treaty signed in December 1991, France surrendered even 
more sovereignty than had been contemplated in Bérégovoy's draft treaty. Member states committed 
themselves to creating a European central bank and a single currency by the year 1999, goals already 
annunciated for French diplomacy.[61] However, to obtain these objectives, France accepted a number 
of German pre-conditions that traditionally had been anathema to its European monetary diplomacy. 
The new European Central Bank would be independent of political control and committed to the 
principle of price stability. Additionally, all national central banks would be made politically 
independent as well. Furthermore, France accepted meaningful policy coordination for the first time, 
through the strict convergence criteria for economic policy established in the treaty, covering price 
stability, interest rates, deficits, debt and currency stability.[62]  
  However, despite the wide ranging sacrifice of national sovereignty the Maastricht Treaty 
represented, France continued to seek restrictions on the idea of supranationality. While France was 
willing to give up more of its national independence, it still sought ways of keeping Community  
institutions under the direction and control of national governments. While the  new European central 
bank would be independent of [political control, the Maastricht treaty gave national governments, 
through the Council of Ministers, the power to set the Ecu's exchange rate against other currencies.[63] 
While this had to be done in consultation with the European Central Bank, it should be noted that an 
important instrument of monetary policy, the exchange rate, rests with national governments  
collectively and not with the European cental bank. Furthermore, despite the rather explicit 
convergence criteria established by the Mastricht Treaty, the final decision on which countries will 
participate in the central bank and single currency must be made collectively by a summit meeting of 
the political leaders of national governments by qualified majority vote.[64] 
 
 
After Maastricht 
 
 
  The Maastricht Treaty expressed a commitment by the European Community to erect new 
monetary institutions, but it did not put them in place. On June 2, 1992, Denmark's narrow rejection of 
the treaty in a binding referendum provoked a prolonged crisis over ratification. Mitterrand acted 
quickly to try to save the Treaty. The day after the Danish vote, Mitterrand issued a joint statement 
with German chancellor Helmut Kohl, reaffirming their deUermination to implement the provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty. To throw more weight behind the treaty, he also announced that France would 
hold its own referendum to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. On the same day, however, the British 
government suspended further consideration of the Maastricht Treaty until after the  French 
referendum and the resolution of the crisis created by the  Danish vote. 
  French leaders soon found themselves engaged in a two front battle at the domestic and 
international levels to save the Maastricht Treaty. On the domestic front, Mitterrand had assumed that 
with opinion polls showing a two to one margin in favor of the treaty, he could safely provide a boost 
to the treaty, bolster his own popularity, and exacerbate divisions within the opposition. However, a 
disparate collection of anti-Maastricht forces each with their own separate agendas had managed to 
erode popular support for the treaty. By the end of August, opinion polls indicated that France was 
almost equally divided over the Maastricht Treaty.   In the face of this unexpected opposition, the French government launched a campaign 
emphasizing the inherent dangers to France of not ratifying the Maastricht treaty. Appearing in a 
televised debate on September 3, Mitterrand emphasized the protection Maastricht would offer against 
external forces. He warned that Maastricht was a necessary corollary to the single market, without 
which Europe, and France along with it, would be economically and politically marginalized.[65] 
France's finance minister, Michel Sapin, declared that Maastricht would allow France to recover its 
monetary sovereignty and warned that without Maastricht, any chance of restricting German 
dominance over Europe's economic policy would disappear.[66] And both the French prime minister 
and foreign minister warned that failure to ratify would mean a weakening of French-German ties both 
politically and economically, leaving France weaker and unable to constrain Germany from steering an 
independent course.[67] As it turned out, French voters narrowly ratified the Maastricht Treaty on 
September 20, by a vote of 51% to 49%. 
  On the international front, the French response to the crisis created by Danish rejection of the 
treaty was to insist publicly that Maastricht could be implemented without Denmark by the remaining 
members of the Community.[68] An emergency meeting of EC foreign ministers in Oslo, Norway, 
endorsed the joint French-German position that Maastricht would not be renegotiated or modified. The 
remaining members of the Community would proceed with ratification, leaving the door open for 
Denmark to reconsider its decision at a later date. The French-German position amounted to a fairly 
explicit threat to go forward without Denmark, and even Britain if necessary, rather than allow the 
treaty to be destroyed. 
  The threat of exclusion proved effective. The EC summit at Edinburgh in December 1992, issued 
a number of "clarifications", that allowed the Danish government to present the treaty in a second 
referendum in May 1993, in which Danish voters ratified it decisively. In July 1993, the British House 
of Commons finally ratified the treaty after long and acrimonious debate, but only after John Major's 
government made it an issue of confidence. After surviving a challenge in Germany's constitutional 
court in October, the treaty finally went into effect on November 1, 1993. 
  Yet despite the ultimate success in ratifying the Maastricht treaty, a series of crises within the 
European Monetary System, seriously challenged the idea that the Community would be able to 
implement it, at least in the area of economic and monetary union. These crises resulted from a 
confluence of forces. First, the prolonged political crisis over ratification reversed earlier expectations 
in financial markets that EMU would succeed. Second, the liberalization of financial flows within the 
Community, the key element in building the single market in finance, made European exchange rates 
even more susceptible to external disruption than they had been in the past. And third, in an effort to 
head off inflationary pressures stemming from German unification, the Bundesbank raised German 
interest rates in July 1992 to their highest level in over 60 years. 
  Things came to a head in September 1992 as the French' referendum approached, forcing a crisis 
within the EMS. On September 16, Great Britain and Italy suspended their participation in the 
exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, while Spain devalued the peseta by 5%.[69] The French 
managed to maintain the franc's value, but only by increasing their own interest rates and by engaging 
in massive intervention on foreign exchange markets in conjunction with Germany. 
  A second crisis erupted within the EMS in August 1993. This was primarily a crisis surrounding 
the French franc. The new right-wing government that came to power in March 1993, engaged in an 
aggressive policy of lowering French interest rates to stimulate growth, cutting the Bank of France's 
intervention rate nine times, from 9.1% to 6.75%, in the space of 3 months, April to July 1993. Based 
on the fact, that the French economy had been outperforming Germany on inflation since July 1991, 
the new government probably believed that there was room to make significant interest rate reductions 
without threatening the value of the franc. Indeed, at the end of June, a senior Bank of France official 
suggested that France could share the anchor role within the European Monetary System with 
Germany.[70] At about the same time, France's new finance minister, Edmond Alphand‚ry, suggested 
that based on the soundness of its economy France was ready to take the lead in setting European 
interest rates and began pressing Germany to cooperate in "concerted" interest rate reductions.[71] 
  These efforts to slip France loose from its D-mark fetters backfired.  International markets 
interpreted 'these moves as a signal that with unemployment above 12% and a presidential election less 
than two years away, France was ready to make a dash for growth and willing to abandon its franc fort 
policy to achieve it if necessary. Concerted French-German exchange rate intervention could not dampen the rush from the franc. Under severe speculative pressures, the EC countries agreed on 
August 2, 1993 to widen the margins of fluctuation between their currencies from ñ2.25% to ñ15%.[72] 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
  Rather than cool French ardor for monetary integration, successive crises in the EMS has 
intensified it. The French seem to have drawn two lessons from the August 1993 EMS crisis. First, 
despite strong economic fundamentals and a better inflation rate than Germany for more than two 
years running, the franc remains vulnerable to the vagaries of the international financial system. 
Second, existing European monetary institutions were not strong enough to contain pressures against 
European exchange rates. Thus rather than cool French ardor for monetary integration, successive 
EMS crises have intensified it. 
  French policy makers continue to declare that the Maastricht timetable can and must be met. They 
insisted that the European Monetary Institute, forerunner to the European Central Bank, begin 
operation as scheduled on January 1, 1994. Furthermore, they have tried to accelerate the process of 
integration, arguing that an "inner core" of states might be able to enter EMU by 1997, the earliest 
deadline set out in the Maastricht treaty. Indeed, France's current finance minister used the latest EMS 
crisis in March 1995 to argue for rapid movement towards EMU: "The sooner, the better."[73] 
  French support for EMU is borne out by its determination to make its economy meet the 
convergence criteria called for in the treaty, despite high levels of unemployment. France has chosen 
closer integration not for its own sake, but because of its vulnerability to international monetary 
disorder. The unification of Germany certainly played an important role by accelerating the process 
and increasing tile risks of failure. Maastricht is seen as the last best chance to end German monetary 
dominance and French vulnerability to international monetary disruptions. If EMU fails, therefore, it 
won't be because of the French. 
  However, the trend towards greater sacrifice of national sovereignty by France for the sake of 
European monetary integration precedes Germall unification and French vulnerability to the 
international monetary system continues after it, as shown by subsequent EMS crises. Since the 
constraints of increased international capital mobility are likely to intensify rather than abate in the 
future, French interest in monetary integration, and the willingness to sacrifice sovereignty to achieve 
it will also undoubtedly increase. As a result, France is likely to continue choosing influence over 
sovereignty. 
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